We propose a simple yet powerful ResNet ensemble algorithm which consists of two components: First, we modify the base ResNet by adding variance specified Gaussian noise to the output of each original residual mapping. Second, we average over the production of multiple parallel and jointly trained modified ResNets to get the final prediction. Heuristically, these two simple steps give an approximation to the well-known Feynman-Kac formula for representing the solution of a transport equation with viscosity, or a convection-diffusion equation. This simple ensemble algorithm improves neural nets' generalizability and robustness towards adversarial attack. In particular, for the CIFAR10 benchmark, with the projected gradient descent adversarial training, we show that even an ensemble of two ResNet20 leads to a 5% higher accuracy towards the strongest iterative fast gradient sign attack than the state-of-the-art adversarial defense algorithm.
Introduction
Residual learning revolutionizes the deep neural nets (DNN) architecture design and makes the ultra-deep, up to more than one thousand layers, neural nets practical [17] . The idea of residual learning motivates the development of a good number of related powerful neural nets, e.g., Pre-activated ResNet [18] , ResNeXt [45] , DenseNet [19] , and many others. Neural nets ensemble is a learning paradigm where many neural nets are jointly used to improve the performance of individual neural nets [16] .
Despite the great success of DNN in image and speech recognition [1] , the vulnerability of DNN to the adversarial attack threatens their applicability in many security-critical tasks, e.g., autonomous cars [2] , robotics [13] , and DNN-based malware detection systems [35, 12] . After the seminal work by Szegedy et al. [40] , many efficient and mathematically elegant adversarial attack methods have been proposed to attack the DNN [11, 34, 7, 43, 20, 5, 8] . The adversarial attacks have been successful in both white-box and black-box scenarios. In white-box attack, the adversarial attacks have access to the architecture and parameters of the neural nets. In black-box attack, the attacks have no access to the details of the underlying model. Black-box attacks are successful because one can perturb an image to cause its misclassification on one DNN, and the same perturbed image also has a significant chance to be misclassified by another DNN; this is known as transferability of adversarial examples [37] . Due to this transferability, it is straightforward to attack neural nets in a black-box fashion [28, 6] . There exist universal perturbations that can imperceptibly perturb any image and cause misclassification for any given network [31] . Dou et al. [9] , analyzed the efficacy of many adversarial attack schemes for a large variety of DNNs. Recently, there has been much work on defending against these universal perturbations [3] .
In this work, we are motivated by the convection-diffusion equation and the Feynman-Kac formula. We propose a simple yet very powerful ensemble algorithm for ResNet. The proposed ensemble algorithm is composed of two essential components. First, for each residual mapping in ResNet, we modify the operation x + F(x) to x + F(x) + N (0, σ 2 ), where x is input to the residual mapping, F represents the mapping and N (0, σ 2 ) is the Gaussian noise with a specially designed variance σ 2 . Second, we average over a given number of parallel and jointly trained base ResNets' predictions to get the final prediction. This straightforward neural nets ensemble algorithm improves neural nets' generalization ability and robustness towards adversarial attacks. For the CIFAR10 benchmark, under the projected gradient descent (PGD) adversarial training, we show that a simple ensemble of two ResNet20 leads to a 5% higher accuracy than ResNet20 towards the most potent adversarial attack applied. Furthermore, we show that ensemble of two ResNet20 is much more adversarially robust than a deeper model -ResNet44.
Related Work
Model averaging with multiple stochastically trained identical DNNs is the most straightforward ensemble technique to improve the predictive power of base DNNs. This simple averaging method has been a success in image classification for ILSVRC competitions. Different groups of researchers use model averaging for different base DNNs and won different ILSVRC competitions [24, 39, 17] . This widely used unweighted averaging ensemble, however, is not data-adaptive and is sensitive to the presence of excessively biased base learners. Ju et al., recently investigated ensemble of DNNs by many different ensemble methods, including unweighted averaging, majority voting, the Bayes Optimal Classifier, and the (discrete) Super Learner, for image recognition tasks. They concluded that the Super Learner achieves the best performance among all the studied ensemble algorithms [21] .
Simple model averaging can improve generalizability of DNN. Another important field of deep learning research is to make DNN robust to an adversarial attack. Defensive distillation was recently proposed to increase the stability of DNN [36] . Image transformation is another interesting family of strategies to counter the adversarial perturbations. For known adversarial attacks, image transformation strategy can defend adversarial attack efficiently [14, 32, 27, 44, 29] . Adversarial training is another family of defense methods to improve the stability of DNN [11, 30, 33] . In particular, the PGD adversarial training achieves state-of-the-art resistance to the possible attacks [30] . GANs are also employed for adversarial defense [38] . In [4] , the authors proposed an approximated gradient to attack the defenses that are based on the obfuscated gradient. Meanwhile, many advanced attacks have been proposed to attack the DNN [43, 20] . Instead of using the softmax function as DNN's output activation, Wang et al. [42, 41] , utilized a class of non-parametric interpolating functions. This is a combination of both deep and manifold learning which causes the DNN to utilize the geometric information of the training data sufficiently. The authors show a significant amount improvements on generalizability and adversarial robustness.
ResNets and Transport Equation
In this section, we consider modeling ResNet, in particular, the pre-activated ResNet [18] as a transport equation on top of the results of E [10] , Haber and Ruthotto [15] , and Li and Shi [26] . This continuum point of view leads to a simple yet exciting ResNet ensemble algorithm. ResNet is built by the cascading of residual mappings and output activation. As shown in Fig. 1 , each residual mapping is realized by adding shortcut connection to connect the input and output of the original mapping (F), usually formed by convolutional and batch normalization layers. Mathematically, the l-th residual mapping can be formulated as
with x 0 =x ∈ T ⊂ R d being a data point in the set T , x l and x l+1 are the input and output tensors of the residual mapping. The parameters W l can be learned by back-propagating the training error. For the widely used residual mapping with the detailed structure shown in Fig. 2 , we have
where W C1 (W B1 ) and W C2 (W B2 ) are the first and second convolutional (batch normalization) layers of the l-th residual mapping, respectively, from top to bottom order. ⊗ and are the convolutional and batch normalization operators, respectively. For ∀x ∈ T with label y, the forward propagation of ResNet can be written as
whereŷ is the predicted label, f is the output activation, typically chosen to be the softmax function, i.e.,
with W FC be the trainable parameters.
To connect ResNet and transport equation, we introduce a temporal partition:
Heuristically, without considering the dimensional consistency, we can regard x k in Eq. (3) as the value of a continuous function x(t) at the time slot t k , then Eq. (3) can be rewritten as
where
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+ Figure 2 : A detailed structure of the residual mapping in the pre-activated ResNet.
Therefore, for ∀x ∈ T , in the continuum limit ResNet can be viewed as the following ODE
Furthermore, Eq. (5) defines the characteristic curves of the following transport equation
Along the characteristic curve determined by Eq. (5), we have
If we enforce the terminal condition at t = 1 for Eq. (7) to be
where f is the aforementioned output activation of ResNet. According to Eq. (8), we have u(x, 0) = u(x(1), 1) = f (x(1)), which is equal to the output of Eq. (6), therefore, the forward propagation of ResNet can be modeled as computing u(x, 0) along the characteristics of the following transport equation
Meanwhile, the backpropagation in training ResNet can be modeled as finding the velocity field, F (x(t), W (t)), for the following control problem
where u(x i , 0) = y i , x i ∈ T with y i be the label of x i , enforces the initial condition on the training data.
Feynman-Kac Formula and ResNet Ensemble
The adversarial vulnerability of ResNet can be considered as the initial value, u(x, 0), of the control problem of the transport equation Eq. (10) is not smooth with respect to x. A small change in x can lead to a massive movement in the value of u(x, 0). In the transport equation, Eq. (9), if the velocity field F (x, W (t)) is very complex, the solution u(x, 0) might even be near singular. When we use this irregular function to classify new data, even though the generalizability might be high, it is straightforward to attack. A simple way to resolve this irregular problem is to make the solution smoother by adding a diffusion term 
is the Laplace operator in R d . Hence, we arrive at the following convection-diffusion equation
Eq. (11) has a smoother solution compared to the original transport equation, Eq. (9). However, Eq. (11) cannot be solved by the method of characteristics. Instead, we can solve this convectiondiffusion equation by the famous Feynman-Kac formula [22] , which gives the solution to Eq. (11) at t = 0 as
where x(t) is an Itô process,
and u(x, 0) is the conditional expectation of f (x(1)).
The Feynman-Kac formalism can be cast into an ensemble of modified ResNet (ResNet') which is named as EnResNet. The stochastic terms in Feynman-Kac formula can be simulated by simply adding a specially designed Gaussian noise, σN (0, 1) where σ = a Var(x l + F(x l )) with a be a tunable parameter (fixed as 0.1 in this work), for each original residual mapping x l+1 = x l + F(x l ). This gives the modified residual mapping x l+1 = x l + F(x l ) + σN (0, 1), as illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Therefore, the ResNet representation of the Feynman-Kac formalism is essentially an ensemble of ResNet' (in the following context we will call ResNet' as ResNet provided there is no ambiguity), as illustrated in Fig. 4 .
Training and testing of the EnResNet are both quite straightforward. They only involve forward and backward propagation of data x through each ResNet, in parallel. We will show this simple ensemble algorithm can improve both generalizability and robustness towards adversarial attacks of the base ResNet.
Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we give a brief review from a mathematical point of view for a few representative adversarial attack schemes. We consider three benchmark attacks: the fast gradient sign [11] , iterative FGSM (IFGSM) [25] , and Carlini-Wagner's L 2 (CW-L2) [7] attack. We denote the ResNet with softmax activation asỹ = f (θ, x) for a given instance (x, y). FGSM searches the adversarial image x with a bounded perturbation by maximizing the loss L(x , y) . = L(f (θ, x ), y), subject to the l ∞ perturbation constraint ||x − x|| ∞ ≤ with as the attack strength. We can approximately solve this constrained optimization problem by using the first order approximation of the loss function i.e.,
. Under this approximation, the optimal adversarial image is
The iterative fast gradient sign method iterates FGSM to generate enhanced adversarial attacks, i.e.,
where m = 1, · · · , M , x (0) = x and x = x (M ) , with M be the number of iterations. Both FGSM and IFGSM belong to fix-perturbation attack. Moreover, we consider a zeroconfidence attack proposed by Carlini and Wagner. For a given image-label pair (x, y), and ∀t = y, CW-L2 searches the adversarial image that will be classified to class t by solving the following optimization problem
subject to
where δ is the adversarial perturbation (for simplicity, we ignore the dependence of θ in f ). 
where Z(x) is the logit vector for an input x, i.e., the output of the neural nets before the softmax layer. Z(x) i is the logit value corresponding to class i. It is easy to see that f (x + δ) = t is equivalent to g(x + δ) ≤ 0. Therefore, the problem in Eq. (15) is equivalent to
where c ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier. By letting δ = This unconstrained optimization problem can be solved efficiently by the Adam optimizer [23] . All three of the attacks clip the values of the adversarial image x to between 0 and 1. Dou et al. [9] , prove that, under a certain regime, CW-L2 can shift the deep neural nets' predicted probability distribution to the desired one. In practice, the following clipped IFGSM is utilized
where α is an additional parameter to be specified in the following experiments.
PGD Adversarial Training
Adversarial training is a family of defensive strategies proposed to defend against adversarial attack. It is shown that most image transformation based adversarial defenses, e.g., total variation minimization, PixelDefend, et al., can be easily broken by circumventing the obfuscated gradient, PGD adversarial training gives the best resistance to all the possible attacks on the CIFAR10 benchmark [4] . Madry et al. [30] , propose to train adversarially robust deep neural nets by using robust optimization algorithms. For the given training data D . = {(x, y)} and loss function L(θ, x, y), we can train an adversarially resistant model f (x, θ) by solving the following min-max formalism
where δ is the admissible adversarial perturbation. The model trained by using Eq. (20) is intrinsically robust to any perturbation in the admissible set S. The interior maximization problem is approximately solved by applying a strong adversarial attack, say, IFGSM, to the clean image, x. We summarize the PGD adversarial training and testing algorithms for EnResNet, respectively, in Algorithms 1 and 2. Compared to training and testing of the standard ResNet, IFGSM attack is applied to the input data before feeding them into neural nets.
Numerical Results
In this section, we validate the efficacy of the proposed ensemble algorithm from the angle of improving both generalizability and robustness toward adversarial attack. For computational efficiency, we choose ResNet20 as the baseline model. For either ResNet20 or different ensembles, we train the model in the following way: we run 200 epochs of stochastic gradient descent (SGD), with weight decay (5 × 10 −4 ) and Nesterov momentum (0.9). The initial learning rate is set to be 0.1, and decay ten times, respectively, at the 80th, 120th, and 160th epochs. During training, the batch size of the CIFAR10 data is set to be 128. We implement the proposed ensemble algorithm in PyTorch, the code will be made available on GitHub.
Robust to Possible Adversarial Attacks
We first test the resistance of the trained models toward the FGSM attack, i.e., IFGSM attack with only one iteration, where the attack strength varies from 1/255 to 8/255. As shown in 
Algorithm 1 Training of the EnResNet by PGD Adversarial Training
Input: Training set: (data, label) pairs (X, Y) .
, N B = #minibatches. Output: A trained EnResNet model, denoted as EnResNet N , i.e., ensemble of N modified ResNets. for i = 1, . . . , N E (where N E is the number of epochs.) do for j = 1,. . . , N B do //IFGSM attack Add perturbation to X i by applying IFGSM to attack the current model EnResNet N , which gives X i .
//Forward-propagation Generate prediction for X i by using the current model EnResNet N , which givesỸ i = EnResNet N (X i ).
//Back-propagation Back-Propagate the cross-entropy loss between Y i andỸ i to update the model EnResNet N . Fig. 5 and Table. 1, without any attack, ensembles of 2 and 5 ResNet20, increase generalization accuracy by 0.61% and 0.67%, respectively. Different ensembles of baseline models increase testing accuracy consistently under different . When < 3/255, a simple ensemble of 2 ResNet20 (denoted as EnResNet 2 20, and the other neural nets ensemble is named in the same manner) gives better robustness toward FGSM attack than an ensemble of 5 ResNet20 . For ≥ 3/255, an ensemble of 5 ResNet20 is more robust to FGSM attack than an ensemble of 2 baseline models. Next, we fix the attack strength = 1/255, and apply different numbers of IFGSM iterations, with α = 8/255, to attack the baseline model and diverse ensembles of the baseline neural nets. The accuracy of different models under the different number of IFGSM attacks is plotted in Fig. 6 and the detailed results are listed in Table. 2. The classification accuracy of the adversarial images increases dramatically when only a few IFGSM iterations are used to generate the adversarial perturbation. For instance, the accuracy improvement is 11.81% and 8.77%, respectively, for the ensemble of 2 and 5 ResNet20s when only two iterations of IFGSM attack is used. However, this
Output: Predicted labelỸ. //IFGSM attack Add perturbation to X by applying IFGSM to attack the model EnResNet N , which gives X i . //Forward propagation Apply the model EnResNet N to predict labels for X , which gives.,Ỹ = EnResNet N (X ).
robustness is just significant under a weak attack in the sense that has fewer iterations. When the number of iterations is more than 6, the accuracy increment becomes less than 1%. Furthermore, we consider the robustness of model ensemble to the CW-L2 attack. For the CW-L2 attack, we set κ = 0, c = 10, and run 10 iterations of the Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.01. The testing accuracy, on the adversarial CIFAR10 images crafted by the CW-L2 attack, for ResNet20, EnResNet 2 20, and EnResNet 5 20 are 5.66%, 5.75%, and 5.72%, respectively. The model ensemble slightly increases adversarial robustness to the CW-L2 attack.
Results on PGD Adversarial Training
In this part, we test performance of the PGD adversarial training numerically. First, let us look at the training and testing accuracy curves for the ResNet20 and EnResNet 2 20, under the IFGSM attack with = 1/255 and M = 10. As depicted in Fig. 7 , both training and testing accuracy for these two models increase roughly monotonically as the iteration increases. When the iteration number becomes more than 170, the accuracy curves plateaued. It is interesting to note that during every learn rate decay there is an accuracy jump even in the PGD adversarial training scenario. The accuracy jump of EnResNet 2 20 is much higher than that of the base ResNet20. Finally, the accuracy gaps for training and testing curves are as much as 10% and 5%, respectively.
We plot the testing accuracy of ResNet20, EnResNet 2 20, and EnResNet 5 20, under the PGD adversarial training, in Fig. 8 . The corresponding numbers are listed in Table. 6. For both ensembles of 2 and 5 ResNet20, there is at least around 5% testing accuracy boost no matter which nonzero attack strength is used. For the case that = 1/255, the accuracy increment can be as large as 7.25%. When ≤ 4/255, the EnResNet 5 20 is more resistant to adversarial attack. However, for the stronger attack, i.e., when > 4/255, the EnResNet 2 20 is slightly more robust to adversarial perturbation. Under the strong attack, there is a 5% accuracy gap between EnResNet20 and baseline model. We conjecture this is an intrinsic gap. In practice, we might use the ensemble of two baseline models to improve the robustness of the baseline model. Table. 4 and plotted in Fig. 9 (a) . The adversarial image of ResNet20 is transferred to EnResNet 2 20 as the accuracy is significantly lower than that testing on the clean ones. However, the accuracy is much higher than that using ResNet20 to classify these adversarial images, for instance, under the strongest FGSM attack with = 8/255, ResNet20 has accuracy 11.44% while EnResNet 2 20 has accuracy of 46.60%. Under the strongest IFGSM attack with = 8/255, ResNet20 and EnResNet 2 20 have accuracy of 0.06% and 40.19%, respectively. It is worth noting that the optimal for IFGSM to generate the best transferable adversarial images is not the largest one; but at = 2/255.
Second, we reverse the previous testing by using ResNet20 to classify adversarial images crafted by attacking EnResNet 2 20. The corresponding results are shown in Table. 5 and Fig. 9 (b). The adversarial images by attacking EnResNet 2 20 are more transferable to ResNet20 as the classification accuracy in Table. 5 are much lower than that in Table. 4. Again, the best transferable adversarial images of IFGSM attack are generated by using = 2/255.
Comparison with Deeper ResNet and Model Capacity
The proposed neural nets ensemble algorithm increases the complexity of the baseline model. Alternatively, we can increase the depth of the model. In this part, we will show the advantage of our ensemble algorithm compared to a deeper network. We compare EnResNet 2 20 with ResNet44 in both generalizability and resistance to adversarial attack. Regarding model complexity, ResNet44 is close to EnResNet 2 20 with slightly more parameters, 0.66M v.s. 0.27M×2. As shown in Tables. 1, and 2, in general, ResNet44 is less robust to FGSM and IFGSM attacks than EnResNet 2 20. The testing accuracy for ResNet44 under CW-L2 attack becomes 4.78%, which is significant lower than the accuracy of other models. Under the PGD adversarial training, as shown in Table. 6 and Fig. 8, ResNet44 has a testing accuracy gap ∼2.5% compared to that of either EnResNet 2 20 or EnResNet 5 20.
Our experiments are consistent with the conclusion of Madry et al. [30] , that is, increasing the model capacity can improve model's accuracy under the PGD adversarial training. As either the network goes deeper or the ensemble of multiple simple nets can increase the model's capacity, our ensemble algorithm is much more efficient in increasing model's capability. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first investigation of neural nets ensemble under the PGD adversarial training. Our ensemble algorithm significantly boosts the performance of the state-of-the-art adversarial defense algorithm -the PGD adversarial training.
Comparison with the Wide ResNet
One might concern that EnResNet 2 20 is more robust to adversarial perturbation because it is less deep and wider than ResNet44. Deeper neural nets might have a bigger Lipschitz constant thus more vulnerable to the adversarial attack. In this section, we will compare the adversarial robustness of EnResNet 2 20 with the wide-ResNet: WRN-14-2 [46] . WRN-14-2 has ∼ 0.69M parameters which is more than that of EnResNet 2 20. Moreover, WRN-14-2 is wider than EnResNet 2 20. We list the generalization accuracy on the CIFAR10 benchmark of the two neural nets under the PGD adversarial training (M = 10) in Table. 6. When there is no attack, i.e., = 0, WRN-14-2 has a 0.47% higher testing accuracy than EnResNet 2 20. However, under the attack, EnResNet 2 20 has a > 4% higher guaranteed accuracy towards the first order adversarial attack than WRN-14-2. 
Concluding Remarks
Motivated by the Feynman-Kac formula, we proposed a straightforward ensemble algorithm for ResNet. This ensemble algorithm consists of two components: adding specially designed Gaussian noise to each residual mapping, and averaging over multiple parallel and jointly trained baseline ResNets. Numerical results on the CIFAR10 show that our ensemble algorithm improves both generalization accuracy and robustness towards adversarial attack. Experiments also show that we show that the ensemble of two ResNet20 dramatically increases resistance, even superior to ResNet44, to adversarial attack if the model is trained by projected gradient descent adversarial training.
In this work, we simply do an unweighted averaging of the modified baseline ResNet to match the discretization of the Feynman-Kac formula. To find the best set of baseline models and optimal combination of these baseline models is under our investigation. 
